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Capital budgeting research has traditionally focused on ever improving the methods used for evaluating 
projects. Since it seems futile to use sophisticated evaluation techniques if their input data – that is, estimates of 
cash inflows and outflows – are of inferior quality, it is justifiable to call this focus into question by exploring 
forecasting accuracy. In order to do so, the article analyzes the empirical findings on estimation error gathered in 
35 studies published between 1954 and 2002. 
As the review shows, over-optimism seems to be a relevant problem in capital expenditure project 
forecasting. This calls the traditional research focus into question. More research effort targeted at the 
misestimation bias in capital budgeting and at ways to improve forecasting accuracy seems necessary. 
 




Capital expenditures have a huge impact on the future profitability and value creation 
of a company and are among the most important managerial decisions.
1 Consequently, capital 
expenditures and capital budgeting have been researched extensively over the past 50 years.
2  
To facilitate this research, it has become customary to subdivide the capital 
expenditure process into several steps: (1) problem definition, (2) idea generation, (3) 
forecasting, (4) evaluation of alternatives, (5) pre-approval checking for accuracy, (6) 
decision making, (7) implementation, (8) monitoring during implementation, (9) start of 
operations, (10) use of equipment, (11) post-completion auditing, and (12) retirement.
3  
However, the level of research effort directed at these steps has been quite different.
4 
In fact, research has focused on the fourth step: the evaluation of alternative investment 
projects.
5 Consequently, numerous evaluation methods have been presented and discussed in 
the theoretical literature.
6 At the same time, researchers have thoroughly investigated the 
application of these evaluation methods, and whether companies relying on “sophisticated” 
evaluation techniques are more successful than their counterparts that employ “old fashioned”    2 
instruments. Research into project evaluation methods, in fact, has been so exhaustive that 
“probably more surveys have been undertaken on the use of capital budgeting techniques than 
on any other accounting and finance topic.”
7
The other steps in the capital expenditure process have received comparatively less 
attention from theoretically- and empirically- oriented researchers. Idea generation, 
forecasting, pre-approval reviews, monitoring and post-completion audits have been 
conspicuously overlooked.
8 Nevertheless, they are typically considered essential steps in an 
effective capital budgeting process.
9
The lack of research into the idea generation and the forecasting phases is especially 
surprising;  if no (or too few) investment alternatives are generated, then there is nothing to be 
evaluated. Furthermore, it seems futile to use sophisticated evaluation techniques if their input 
data – that is, estimates of cash inflows and outflows – are of inferior quality.
10  
Therefore, it seems justifiable to call the traditional focus of capital budgeting research 
into question by exploring idea generation and forecasting. If the traditional focus of research 
is correct, then there should be no significant problems in either of these phases. If, however, 
such an analysis revealed that practitioners do encounter significant problems in one or both 
of these steps, then capital budgeting researchers should consider shifting their focus to one or 
both of those steps. 
To the author’s knowledge, there is no review of the findings and the validity of 50 
years of empirical research on the efficiency of companies’ idea generation or forecasting in 
capital budgeting. This article intends to reduce this gap by analyzing the empirical findings 
on forecasting accuracy, i.e. on the presence, direction and magnitude of errors and biases in 
capital expenditure project estimates.
11 In order to do so, it will present and discuss the 
findings from 25 empirical studies.
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2. Method of data collection and analysis 
 
A three- step method of data collection was used to compile the 25 studies included in 
this review:  
(a) Systematic journal search: In a first step, several journals on management, 
management accounting and capital budgeting were looked through article by article 
for publications dealing with forecasting accuracy in capital expenditure project 
plans.
12 
(b) IT-based literature search: Based on the titles found and keywords used in the first 
step, specialized databases (ABI-Inform, DIGIBIB, EBSCO, Emerald-Fulltext, GBI – 
Wiso-Net, and the Proquest/UMI database of dissertations) and the internet were 
searched.
13 
(c) References-based search: The third step consisted of a systematic review of the 
references cited in the empirical studies uncovered in Steps One and Two.  
This process yielded 25 empirical studies on estimation accuracy in capital expenditure 
project plans. 
These studies, which are described in Table 1, come from Cyprus, Finland, Germany, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They cover a time from the early 
1950s to the year 2002. Sample sizes vary from single company studies to large scale analyses 
of up to 500 corporations. Methods used for data collection include postal surveys, personal 
interviews, documental analyses and self-reports of the respective author’s practical 
experiences.  
As can be seen from Table 1 the majority of empirical studies on investment planning 
accuracy does not lend itself to a quantitative meta-analysis. As a consequence, this article 
will consist of a qualitative review of the major findings and the methodology of the studies.
14
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Dean (1954)  ?  USA  ?  ?  ?  1  I, D 
Carter/Williams (1958)   1955 - 1956  UK  V*  A  269  246  I 
Zoeller (1959)  ?  USA  I  L  1  1  P 
Helfert (1960)  ?  USA  I  L  ?  3  I, D 
Scheffler (1961)  ?  GER  I  A  ?  31  ? 
Williams/Scott (1965)  1956 - 1965?  UK  V*  L  ?  14  I, D 
Honko (1966)  1964 - 1965  FIN  I*  M?, L 55  38 (40)  I, Q 
Myers (1966)  ?  USA  I*  L  ?  1  D 
Kempster (1967)  ?  USA  I  L  ?  28  I 
Terborgh (1967)  ?  USA  I  L  1  1  D 
Bower (1970)  1965 - 1967  USA  I  L  1  1  I, D 
Carter (1971)  ?  USA  I  M  1  1  I, D 
Henderson (1971)  1968  USA  I  L  500  500  D 
Dillon (1974)  ?  USA  I  L  ?  76  I, Q 
Honko/Virtanen (1975)  1973  FIN  I  L  50  46  F 
Viafore (1975)  1972 - 1974  USA  V*  L  79  4 (23)  I, D 
Van Vleck (1976)  1973  USA  V*  L  650  241  Q 
Merrow/Phillips/Myers (1981)  1978-1980  USA  I*  A  ?  34  D 
Honko/Prihti/Virtanen (1982)  1981  FIN  I  L  30  30  I 
Arnold (1986)  1982  USA  I  L  1  1  ? 
Bromiley (1986)  ?  USA  I*  ?  ?  4  I, D 
Pruitt/Gitman (1987)  1986  USA  I  L  500  121  Q 
Weber/Linder/Spillecke (2002)  2001  GER  V*  L  4  4  I, D 
Pieroth (2002)  ?  CH  I  L  1  1  P 
Lazaridis (2002)  2002  CYP  ?  M, S  120  100  Q 
Country Surveyed: CH = Switzerland; CYP = Cyprus; FIN = Finland; GER = Germany; UK = 
United Kingdom; USA = United States of America; Type of Business Surveyed: V = both, 
industrials (including utilities) and service companies; I = only industrials (including utilities); D = 
only service companies; * = only some businesses out of all industry or respectively services 
business fields; Company Size: A = all sizes; L = large companies; M = medium sized; S = small 
firms; Method(s) Used: I = interview; Q = questionnaire; D = document analysis; P = self-report.  
A question mark (“?”) denotes missing information. 
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3. Results 
3.1. First empirical evidence from the 1950s 
Dean (1954) might have been the first to analyze the accuracy of capital expenditure 
estimates. His study deals with the capital budgeting practices at an unspecified U.S. 
company. In approximately one third of that company’s investment projects, actual values 
deviated from expected ones by about 25 percent.
15 However, Dean (1954) neither specifies 
the direction of these deviations, nor provides further details on the forecasting errors. 
A more detailed analysis is included in a study by Carter and Williams (1958). They 
surveyed 246 British companies of varying sizes and looked at the relationships between 
forecasted and realized earnings as well as between expected and actual costs. Their study 
shows that in almost three- quarters of the companies surveyed, actual and planned earnings 
deviated from each other by more than 50 percent. In about a quarter of the companies 
analyzed, the deviations exceeded 100 percent !
16 As a result, the correlation of expected and 
realized earnings is as low as 0.13.
17 With regard to the direction of deviation, Carter and 
Williams (1958) arrive at an almost even split between earnings over- and underestimations.
18 
Their study, therefore, suggests a lack of knowledge on the part of the planning personnel as 
the root cause of these deviations, not an asymmetric (thoughtful or unaware) biasing of 
estimates. However, Carter and Williams (1958) also point out that there is a tendency in 
some of the companies “to estimate ‘hopefully’ and [in] others to estimate ‘conservatively.’”
19 
The study neither elaborates upon this point nor takes a closer look at the influence of 
company size, business fields, or similar factors. It does, however, identify a similar tendency 
of estimation errors in cost forecasts; once again “some companies persistently under-estimate 
the cost of their projects [...]. Other companies obtain a very close agreement with estimates – 
errors or [sic!] less than 2 per cent, being common.”
20 But as for the errors in projected    6 
earnings, the study neither includes a further breakdown of the results by different business 
fields nor provides any exact data on the spreading and size of errors. 
Zoeller (1959) chooses an approach quite different from that of Carter and Williams 
(1958): He limits his analysis to a careful review of the capital expenditure planning accuracy 
of a single U.S. company: Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. His study shows that the results 
obtained from the individual investments deviated by as much as minus 269 percent to plus 
233 percent from the expected values.
21 Even though, some of the realized investments’ actual 
values come very close to the planned ones, Zoeller (1959) notes that the realized economies 




3.2. More detailed evidence from the 1960s and 1970s 
The first study of capital expenditure planning accuracy in the 1960s was conducted 
by Helfert (1960). He compares actual to planned profitability of the investments 
implemented at three large U.S. industrials. At the first company his analysis extends over 
150 capital expenditure projects that had been undertaken over the previous nine years. In 
these 150 projects actual profitability reached 99.1 percent of expected (i.e. planned) 
profitability.
23 In the second company, Helfert (1960) reviews the profitability of 71 projects 
implemented the year before. Here, the actual profitability attained only 76.7 percent of the 
planned one. For the third company (some 60 projects over the previous two years) Helfert’s 
(1960) study yielded an actual profitability of 95.8 percent.
24  
The second study from this decade was written by Scheffler (1961), who studied 31 
German industrial companies of varying sizes. While his analysis does not include any 
detailed information on the spreading and direction of errors or biases, Scheffler (1961) points    7
out that over- and underestimation of planned values ranged typically in the area of 10 
percent.
25
Williams and Scott’s (1965) analysis of fourteen large British companies from various 
industries found, that negative deviations (i.e. deviations due to over-optimism) outnumber 
the positive ones.
26 While they do not provide the reader with a detailed quantitative review of 
the magnitude of the disparities, they interviewed the responsible personnel from the fourteen 
companies to discern the reasons. Several of the reasons indicated over-confident or over-
optimistic planning.  
In contrast to Helfert (1960) and Williams and Scott (1965), Honko (1966) shows that 
the overwhelming majority (75 percent) of the responding 38 Finnish industrials typically 
managed to attain actual results that were superior to the initially forecasted ones.
27 Only nine 
percent of the firms reported that their original forecasts are “always” or “often” better than 
the results finally obtained from an implemented investment project.
28
Myers (1966) concludes from an analysis at a U.S. chemical company, that investment 
proposals relating to equipment necessary for new product introductions can be described as 
conservative. While this conclusion is more or less consistent with the Honko’s results (1966), 
it seems inconsistent with the review of U.S. practices by Helfert (1960). Unfortunately, 
Myers (1966) does not provide any quantitative analysis or details of the deviations .  
Some years after the report by Zoeller (1959), the Allis-Chalmers Corporation is once 
more the focus of research on planning accuracy: Terborgh (1967), looking at the results from 
fiscal year 1965, notes that even though forecasted and actual values seem to be in line, the 
actual profits obtained from individual investments may well lie up to 189 percent above or 
up to 76 percent below expected profits.
29
Kempster (1967) concludes from a review of capital expenditure sums planned vs. 
actually required at 28 large U.S. industrial companies, that “it is quite common for project    8 
estimates to be exceeded when the actual expenditures are made.”
30 He does not, however, 
provide any more explanation. 
In contrast to Kempster (1967) Bower (1970) looks at 50 capital expenditure projects 
of a single, large industrial company.
31 For the actual values of production enlargement 
projects included in this sample, Bower (1970) arrives at a meager 60 percent of expected 
values.
32 And in the case of investments related to new products, actual values amounted to 
only 10 percent of forecasted ones. Only in the case of capital expenditure projects targeted at 
reducing costs or rationalizing production, the realized values exceeded the forecasts by 10 
percent.
33  
Once again limited to one company is Carter’s (1971) review of capital budgeting at a 
start-up company in the computer industry. He concludes that there seems to be enthusiasm 
and rather dubious cash flow forecasts at that company.
34 However, his study does not 
provide us with any (quantitative) details on the errors. 
Henderson (1971) chooses a somewhat different approach. Based upon publicly 
available data he calculates the respective returns on invested capital of the Fortune 500 
industrials and compares them to common minimum hurdle rates for each industry. Adjusting 
the published figures for cost of outside financing, he arrives at an actual total return on 
invested capital of about 8 percent.
35 Considering the fact that most companies have hurdle 
rates of about 15 percent, Henderson (1971) concludes that “it does seem illogical that 
businessmen have planned for a return of only 6 to 8 per cent, especially when a number of 
guaranteed bonds now provide this level of return. This leads to a very strong suspicion, if not 
actual proof, that there is a massive failure among capital expenditure plans in North 
American industrial companies to provide the returns on investment which have been forecast 
or budgeted.”
36
Dillon (1974) does not look directly at the spreading and magnitude of flaws in capital 
expenditure plans, but rather focuses on the reasons why a capital expenditure project might    9
fall off its forecasts. He concludes that “overestimation of potential profitability or cost 
savings”
37 is the most common reason for projects to fall off their expected values. The 
second most common reason are faulty assumptions about the factors and parameters 
influencing the future cash flows of a project.
38 Both reasons point to errors in initial capital 
expenditure planning forecasts.  
About ten years after the first study on capital expenditure practices in Finland, Honko 
and Virtanen (1975) reexamined Finland’s industrial firms. About 85 percent of the 46 large 
companies surveyed (one quarter of which had already been interviewed in the earlier study) 
reported that the actual initial expenditures for a capital project often exceeded the planned 
ones.
39 Only a slight negative tendency could be established for the costs of individual 
projects while in operation. However, Honko and Virtanen (1975) also conclude that the 
benefits derived from an investment are underestimated in about 70 percent of the surveyed 
companies. Comparing their results with those of Honko (1966), they identify a small increase 
in (negative) deviations between expected values and actual ones.
40
Limited to four large U.S. companies, a study by Viafore (1975) arrives at a result 
similar to that of Henderson (1971): between 1972 and 1974 actual values remained typically 
around 10 percent below pre-acceptance cash flow estimates.
41  
Van Vleck (1976) conducted a large and extensive study of capital expenditure 
planning accuracy. The study is based upon questionnaires completed by 241 large U.S. 
companies in 21 different fields and tries to answer the question about planning accuracy by 
means of several distinct sub-analyses. In the first analysis of the planned and realized 
earnings at all 241 firms, Van Vleck (1976) demonstrates that “corporations tend to be 
optimistic when they forecast yields on capital projects.”
42 By splitting up the reasons for 
discrepancies, he shows that deviations due to optimistic planning (i.e. overestimation of 
earnings and/or underestimation of actual outlays) occurred nearly three times as often as did 
those that were due to pessimistic planning. Furthermore, while deviations due to under-   10 
optimism are typically in the range of 5 to 10 percent, those which can be traced to over-
optimism lie between 5 and 15 percent.
43 However, only a relatively small number of 
companies reported that errors exceeding 15 percent occurred rather often.
44  
In a second analysis, Van Vleck (1976) breaks down the figures on the 21 different 
business fields. His data shows that in none of these 21 fields did errors resulting from 
pessimism outnumber those due to over-optimism.
45 The largest deviations between planned 
and actual values for capital expenditure projects took place in the electronics and home 
appliances, chemicals, glass, concrete, metals, mining, and textile businesses.
46 The 
pharmaceutical industry produced the smallest errors.  
A third analysis, which tries to establish a correlation between company size (sales) 
and error magnitude, yields no significant results.
47  
In a fourth analysis, Van Vleck (1976) tests the influence of capital expenditure 
planning accuracy on company profitability. But once again, the analysis yields no conclusive 
relationship.
48  
Van Vleck’s (1976) fifth analysis attempts – just like Henderson (1971) – to draw 
conclusions on planning accuracy based upon the relation of total return on invested capital 
(after taxes) and the companies’ minimum hurdle rates. The results show that in most business 
fields, actual returns on investment are lower than the respective hurdle rates.
49 In fact, 
companies as diverse as aeronautics, electronics and home appliances, chemicals, nutrition, 
glass, concrete, metals, paper products, rubber, ship-building and railroad supplies, and 
textiles did not reach their respective minimum hurdle rates.
50 Since it seems unlikely that the 
management of these companies approved capital projects that did not (according to the 
respective forecasts) meet the minimum hurdle rates, Van Vleck (1976) assumes that the 
profit potential of the capital expenditures or the capital outlays necessary had been 
miscalculated. This conclusion is compatible with the reasons for discrepancies mentioned by 
the companies in Van Vleck’s (1976) sample. The three most often cited factors responsible    11
for the deviations are an underestimation of project costs, an underestimation of cost while in 
operation and an overestimation of profit potential.
51   
 
3.3. Newer evidence from the 1980s and onwards 
 
While the study by Merrow, Phillips and Myers (1981) focuses only on pioneer plant 
investments in the chemical process industries (of oil, chemicals, minerals etc.), it indicates 
that cost estimates established at the beginning of the construction period of the 44 pioneer 
process plants in review, covered usually only 93 percent of actual costs.
52  Cost estimates 
completed during the project engineering phase accounted for only 78 (early in engineering) 
and 83 (later in engineering) percent of actual cost.
53 Consequently, Merrow, Phillips and 
Myers (1981) conclude that “the experience of the plants in our database reveals a pattern and 
magnitude of misestimation that stands in sharp contrast to the usual expectation that actual 
costs will fall symmetrically within established and relatively limited ranges of estimated 
costs.”
54 Deviations of estimated from actual costs were largest for new technologies i.e. first-
of-a-kind plants.
55 In fact, most of the variation found in cost-estimation error can be 
explained by three factors: “(1) the extent to which the plant’s technology departs from that of 
prior plants, (2) the degree of definition of the project’s site and related characteristics, and (3) 
the complexity of the plant.”
56 Similarly, with respect to the performance of the projects, the 
study of Merrow, Phillips and Myers (1981) shows that “the routinely high performance 
assumed for pioneer process plants when financial analyses are done is unrealistic. Over 50 
percent of the plants in our sample failed to achieve their production goals in the second six 
months after start-up.”
57 Once again, there is a positive link between the measures of new 
technology and size of the misestimation.
58     12 
The second study from the 1980s deals with practices in Finland. Honko, Prihti and 
Virtanen (1982) conducted another study of investment processes in 30 large industrial 
companies. Even though they did not ask the interviewees explicitly about the spreading and 
magnitude of deviations between planned and realized values of individual capital 
expenditure projects, their investigation of the reasons for unsuccessful investments 
nevertheless gives us some idea about the topic in question. They arrive at “one-sided 
planning assumptions”
59 as a central reason for investment failures.
60 However, they also  
point out that “the 87 investment failures are not a very significant proportion of the 
enterprises’ total number of investments.”
61   
Arnold (1986) describes the case of Cloud Tool Company, a large oil-field equipment 
manufacturer, that experienced serious economic troubles after a large plant expansion project 
turned out to be far less profitable than expected.
62 However, he does not elaborate in more 
detail on capital expenditure estimation accuracy at Cloud Tool Company. 
Bromiley’s (1986) study is concerned with the overall sum of capital outlays (planned 
versus actual) and total income from these investments (forecasted vs. actual) at three U.S. 
heavy manufacturing firms. Based on extensive interviews with employees of different levels 
and functions he noted that “interviewees agreed that many of their forecasts were biased in 
the statistical sense. Many said forecast investment was from 5 to 10 percent above what 
would actually be spent. Many reported that forecasts of income would be conservative.”
63 
While these statements point to clear pessimism or “conservatism” in capital expenditure 
plans, Bromiley (1986) also discovered that “some corporations maintained several different 
sets of forecasts: optimistic ones to motivate lower-level managers, ‘accurate’ ones for top 
management, and conservative ones for finance purposes and for discussions with the finance 
and banking communities.”
64 If this were a common practice among most companies, the 
divergent results of empirical studies of capital expenditure planning accuracy could well be    13
explained by differences in the respondents (different hierarchies, different functions) and 
their respective different “forecasted values.”
65
A large scale study of U.S. American practices is provided by Pruitt and Gitman 
(1987), who surveyed the Fortune 500 industrials (121 responses). In their study, 80 percent 
of the respondents stated, that according to their experience the earnings potentials of capital 
expenditure projects are typically overestimated.
66 Additionally, 43 percent of the respondents 
claimed that the outlays for purchasing or implementing a capital expenditure project were 
generally underestimated.
67 Misestimation of necessary capital outlays seems especially 
common with investments in advanced technologies and new processes.
68 The study, 
however, does not provide any detailed (quantitative) data on the magnitude of these 
discrepancies. 
In a study of capital budgeting processes at four large German companies (three 
industrials and one service company) Weber, Linder and Spillecke (2002) state that their 
interviewees complained about over-optimism and manipulations in capital expenditure 
planning.
69 However, their study does not provide any quantitative figures on these errors or 
biases in forecasts.  
Similarly Pieroth (2002) discusses a problem with over-optimism at a multinational 
consumer products company but does not offer any quantitative data.
70
The most recent large empirical investigation of investment forecasting accuracy was 
conducted in Cyprus by Lazaridis (2002). In contrast to the other studies presented and 
discussed in this article, Lazaridis focuses on small and medium sized companies. Of the 100 
responding companies, 33.7 percent managed to reach the initially forecasted values within an 
interval of plus or minus 5 percent. The majority of the enterprises, however, faced larger 
deviations of 6 to 10 percent (31.6 percent of respondents), 11 to 15 percent (23.5 %), 
percent), 16 to 20 percent (5.1 %) and of over 20 percent (6.1 %)!
71 Unfortunately, the study    14 
does not include any information on the direction of these deviations and whether company 
size plays any role. 
 
4. Discussion of Results 
 
Overall, the findings of the various empirical studies from the past 50 years draw a 
rather unpleasant picture both of investment planning accuracy
72 and of the research into this 
topic.  
Most studies show deviations between forecasted and realized values, which – at least 
according to some of the studies – can be quite significant.
73 Furthermore, many studies found 
that these deviations are probably less a consequence of bad luck or random influences than of 
lopsided planning.
74 In fact, over-optimism could be a serious problem in capital expenditure 
project forecasting.  
However, even after fifty years of empirical research, the evidence on the 
misestimation phenomenon, does not provide a precise answer about the magnitude of over-
optimism in capital expenditure forecasting.
75 Nor does it permit valid conclusions on the 
impact of this inaccuracy on corporate performance. In fact, eight major problem areas 
account for the current lack of knowledge on inaccuracy in capital expenditure planning 
estimates: 
a)  Unsatisfactory sampling procedures and sample sizes: Even when excluding the 
anecdotal evidence by Dean (1954), Myers (1966), Carter (1971), Dillon (1974), 
Weber, Linder and Spillecke (2002) and Pieroth (2002), the sampling procedures and 
sample sizes remain weak spots in the currently available empirical studies. With the 
exception of Carter and Williams (1958), Honko (1966), Henderson (1971), Honko 
and Virtanen (1975), Van Vleck (1976), Merrow et al. (1981), Pruitt and Gitman    15
(1987), and Lazaridis (2002), the studies are based on samples too small to be 
representative of the respective populations.
76 Since sample sizes in many other 
research areas are typically larger,
77 it seems improbable that researchers would not 
have preferred larger samples in the field of assessing estimation accuracy. 
Consequently, it is hard to imagine any other reason for the small sample sizes than an 
unwillingness of the companies to participate in the studies.
78 While one can only 
speculate about the reasons, a fear of “loss of face” as a result of low estimation 
accuracy cannot be discounted.
  
b)  Possible respondent bias: As Bromiley (1986) shows, it cannot be excluded that the 
results obtained in the studies will differ with the hierarchical level and function of the 
respondents.
79 Further investigation into this topic (e.g. by means of a multi-trait-
multi-method study) would be necessary to determine whether this finding can be 
generalized and how large the possible error from asking just one respondent might 
be.  
c)  Unsatisfactory data analysis: It is startling that some of the studies neglected to 
investigate the direction and magnitude of deviations. For example, the survey by 
Lazaridis (2002), which showed that deviations exist not only for very large 
corporations but also for small- and medium sized corporations,
80 unfortunately does 
not indicate the direction of these deviations. Therefore, it does not answer the 
question of whether misestimation is symmetrical or not – thereby limiting the value 
of the study. The study by Pruitt and Gitman (1987) demonstrates the tendency of 
some studies to rely solely on verbal statements of estimation error and to omit asking 
the respondents for the exact magnitudes of deviations (and the respective proportion 
of these deviations of the total of the investments undertaken).  
d)  No clear separation of different project types in the studies: As shown in the analyses 
by Bower (1970), Merrow, Phillips and Myers (1981), and Pruitt and Gitman (1987),    16 
forecasting reliability is likely to be lower for first-of-a-kind capital expenditures than 
for replacement projects.
81 Therefore, an analysis of forecasting accuracy should 
differentiate between these two types of projects. However, the overwhelming 
majority of existing studies does not account for a separate analysis of these two 
groups of projects. 
e)  Doubtful suitability of time period used for calculating actual values: Several authors 
like Carter and Williams (1958) limit their analysis of actual values to an excerpt of 
the total life span of the respective investments. While this may not significantly 
distort the cost data, it might introduce significant error in the earnings figures, since 
the time necessary for new equipment or plants to reach normal operation is not the 
same for all projects and industries and since revenues from production in many 
industries (especially manufacturing) are more volatile or cyclical than costs.
82 The 
limitation of the analysis to just a couple of months or years after start of operations 
could therefore lead to figures that misrepresent the success or failure of a project over 
its total life span. This in turn, could cause wrong conclusions about the existence, 
magnitude and direction of errors in expected earnings from an investment.
83 While it 
cannot be determined, if the results of the existing studies suffer in a statistically 
significant manner from the limitation of the time period used for establishing the 
actual outcomes of the projects, an analysis covering all or at least most of the lifespan 
would surely be a more precise and reliable basis for drawing conclusions about 
estimation accuracy. 
f)  Questionable test for relationship between forecasting accuracy and company 
performance: The only author who tried to establish a link between forecasting 
accuracy and company performance is Van Vleck (1976). While his attempt is 
laudable, some critical words about his analysis, nevertheless, are necessary. Relying 
on profitability as a sole proxy of company performance can be criticized, since purely    17
financial indicators may not be representative of overall (long-term) corporate 
performance.
84 In recent discussions of balanced indicator systems (like e.g. the 
Balanced Scorecard) most authors emphasized the one-sidedness of traditional 
financial indicators and the need for a more balanced view of competitive 
performance.
85 Moreover, limiting the profitability analysis to a single year, 1972,  
while problematic due to cyclical up- and downturns, is especially ill-suited to capital 
expenditure management, which will typically have a longer term impact on company 
performance. While this limitation was probably the only viable solution to exclude 
the “exceptional”
86 years of 1973 and 1974 from his analysis, it nevertheless remains 
problematic. In fact, the limitation of the analysis to jus the profitability of 1972 could 
explain why Van Vleck’s (1976) survey only yields insignificant results for the 
relationship of estimation accuracy on corporate performance. 
g)  Lack of quality checking of results: Most authors neglected to check their results for 
statistical significance and freedom from bias. Carter and Williams (1958), for 
example, did not check their result of equal distribution of over- and underestimation 
for statistical significance. Furthermore, in the existing empirical research on 
estimation accuracy, the samples were not adequately checked for a possible non-
response bias.
87  
h)  Lack of up to date studies: Quite surprisingly, the review did not uncover any 
empirical study on planning accuracy for the 1990s.
88 Furthermore, while planning 
accuracy in capital expenditure management was conducted predominantly by 
researchers from the U.S. from the 1950s to the early 1980s, interest in the topic 
waned in the late 1980s and 1990s. The last U.S. study to deal with the topic was 
conducted by Pruitt and Gitman (1987). Since then, no further investigation of 
planning accuracy in capital budgeting has taken place in North America. Similarly,    18 
when excluding the anecdotal evidence of Pieroth (2002) and Weber, Linder and 
Spillecke (2002), the only recent study at all is the one by Lazaridis (2002).  
 
5. Conclusions and implications for future research 
 
The review of the existing empirical evidence on errors and biases in capital 
expenditure project forecasts yields two rather unpleasant results:  
Firstly, the review of empirical evidence from the past 50 years showed that most 
studies discovered deviations between forecasted and realized values. Furthermore, a large 
number of the studies found that these deviations resulted not from bad luck or pure random 
influences, but from one-sided (optimistic) biasing of forecasts. This calls the traditional 
assumption of freedom from biases into question. In fact, over-optimism is a relevant problem 
in capital expenditure project forecasting, and one that merits more research effort.  
Secondly, the review yielded a mixed picture about the existing empirical studies. In 
fact, empirical research in this field is characterized by unsatisfactory sampling procedures 
and sample sizes, possible respondent biases, unsophisticated data analysis, a lack of analysis 
of different types of capital expenditure projects, an absence of checking of results for 
accuracy, a dubious time period used for calculating actual values, a questionable test for a 
relationship between forecasting accuracy and company performance, and a general lack of up 
to date research. The status quo of empirical research on forecasting accuracy, therefore, is 
rather crude. A more thorough empirical investigation of the existence, direction and 
magnitude of discrepancies between planned and realized values on the one hand, and their 
impact on overall company performance, on the other, is a prerequisite for future research 
dealing with the reasons of these biases in order to overcome or at least minimize them.     19
The results of this review point to three major areas of future research. Researchers 
should explore more through the existence, direction and magnitude of discrepancies between 
planned and realized values and the impact of these deviations on corporate performance. 
Using this knowledge, researchers could search for the reasons that led to the forecasting 
errors and biases. Agency theory, game theory and theories drawn from the behavioral 
sciences, for example, might be fruitful avenues for determining the causes of the 
misestimates. Since, research in business administration has the ultimate objective of   
improving companies’ performance, a third arena for future research would be the 
development of concepts and tools that will reduce the biases and errors in capital expenditure 
estimates. Pre-approval reviews and post-completion audits, can lead to an increased work 
effort and individual and collective learning effects.
89 These, in turn, may allow for better 
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